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A Tiger and a President: Imperceptible




Neuroscientific research suggests that the brain has evolved specific capabilities
enabling automatic social judgments of others to be made based on facial prop-
erties alone. However, little research in marketing has considered the conse-
quences of how facial imagery is automatically processed. We explore automatic
perceptions of familiarity by using morphing software to digitally combine unfamiliar
faces with those of Tiger Woods and George Bush. Despite a complete lack of
conscious recognition, trustworthiness ratings of the composite faces are clearly
influenced by the celebrities in question. This appears to be due to implicit rec-
ognition being sufficient for individuals to automatically access their own summary
valence judgments of either Woods or Bush. Alternative explanations based on a
perceptual-fluency account, or implicit recognition sufficient to perceive specific
trait ratings, are ruled out. These findings suggest that the marketing practice of
digitally manipulating the attractiveness of facial imagery risks overlooking the
important influence of familiarity.
Human faces are arguably the most important visual stimuliwe perceive. They are quite staggeringly complex and
represent an exceptionally rich source of social information,
which we have evolved to be extremely adept at decoding
(Engell, Haxby, and Todorov 2007). For example, faces not
only reveal a tremendous amount of information about our
underlying emotions, but the mere adoption of certain facial
expressions is sufficient to moderate the underlying physiology
and subjective experience of emotion (Ekman 1992). Further-
more, we begin to mimic facial expressions soon after birth
(Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1993), infer movement tra-
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jectories and intentions from peoples’ gazes (Nummenmaa,
Hyona, and Hietanen 2009), and are astonishingly adept at
rapidly identifying angry faces in crowds (Hansen and Hansen
1988). In fact, evidence from cognitive, developmental, and
evolutionary psychology, as well as from cognitive neu-
roscience, supports the face-specificity hypothesis, which
suggests that the face represents a “special” (and possibly
unique) class of stimuli whose processing is handled by
discrete and specialized neural circuits (Kanwisher and
Yovel 2006).
Indeed, converging evidence suggests that the human brain
has evolved specific capabilities that enable automatic social
judgments of others (such as how trustworthy they are) to be
made based on facial properties alone (Critchley et al. 2000;
Engell et al. 2007; Winston et al. 2002). That humans have
evolved to be highly sophisticated (and automatic) interpreters
of facial information has potentially profound implications
for marketers. After all, from decorative models in cosmetics
ads to celebrity endorsers of sodas, facial imagery is nearly
ever-present across all forms of marketing communication. It
is thus rather surprising how little research in marketing has
directly explored the implications of how people automati-
cally code (and respond to) facial stimuli.
While there has certainly been a growing awareness
among marketing researchers that environmental cues can
automatically influence consumer behavior, this work has
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to date largely focused on examining the effects of lexical
and brand primes on specific goals and traits (Chartrand
et al. 2008; Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons 2008).
Although automatic responses to some more overtly social
cues (such as the presence of interpersonal mimicry; Tanner
et al. 2008) have been studied, relatively little research has
specifically examined automatic evaluation of facial cues. The
research that does exist has tended to focus on certain effects
of specific expressions, such as in research on emotional con-
tagion (Howard and Gengler 2001; Small and Verochi 2009)
rather than chronic (emotionally neutral) features of the face.
However, given the emerging neuropsychological evidence
that our brains are essentially hardwired to automatically pro-
cess facial information, we believe that research on automatic
processing of facial imagery merits considerably broader at-
tention from marketing scholars.
The current research was conceived to explore one aspect
of automatic facial processing that has the potential to be
highly relevant to marketers. Specifically, we are interested
in whether perceptions of the trustworthiness of unfamiliar
faces (i.e., of apparently unknown individuals) can be in-
fluenced by incorporating subtle facial cues of familiar peo-
ple into the faces in question. This question was motivated,
in part, by the finding from the facial morphing literature
that subtly (and imperceptibly) incorporating elements of an
individual’s own face into an otherwise unfamiliar face in-
creases reported trust in, and/or preference for, the unfamiliar
face (Bailenson et al. 2009; DeBruine 2002). Importantly,
since the self is simultaneously both similar and familiar, it
is unclear from this stream of research whether a similarity-
or familiarity-based process underlies the observed positive
effects. A primary goal of our research was to better un-
derstand these competing explanations. We do this by re-
lying on faces that are familiar but not similar to those of
our participants. Specifically, we investigate the effect of
subtly incorporating elements of celebrity images into oth-
erwise unfamiliar faces.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First,
we provide a brief overview of research on automatic facial
processing, which suggests that perceptions of trust can be
automatically determined based on facial cues alone. Sec-
ond, we review the existing finding from the digital morph-
ing literature that subtle incorporation of self-images into
unfamiliar faces increases perceived trust in the individuals
pictured, and we discuss both similarity- and familiarity-
based explanations that could underlie this effect. Finally,
we present four studies that explore the effects of morphing
unknown faces with highly familiar celebrity images. These
studies enable us to make the following claims. First, morph-
ing unknown faces to contain imperceptible cues of familiar
individuals can lead to similar positive effects on perceived
trustworthiness as does self-morphing. Second, this effect
appears to be driven by implicit recognition of the specific
familiar individual concerned rather than by either a more
general fluency effect or by some aspect of their facial struc-
ture that they may share with others. Third, this implicit
recognition appears sufficient for a broad approach/avoid
valence pertaining to the familiar individual to be perceived
but is insufficient for specific trait assessments of them to
be accessed from memory.
AUTOMATIC FACIAL PROCESSING
Accurate social judgments have in all likelihood been a
significant determinant of human survival and indeed of
the survival of our primate ancestors (Winston et al. 2002).
For example, from an evolutionary biology perspective, the
ability to quickly discern whether a stranger might be hostile
and/or untrustworthy could significantly enhance an indi-
vidual’s ultimate chance of reproductive success (Cacioppo
2004). In fact, research suggests that almost all the stimuli
we encounter are evaluated on a positive/negative valence
dimension (Bargh 1997; Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum
1957), with these evaluations evoking approach and avoid
behavioral tendencies (Corwin 1921; Lewin 1935). More-
over, in social contexts, specifically, these valence evalua-
tions serve as a central input into person-impression for-
mation (Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick 2007; Kim and Rosenberg
1980).
Considerable evidence now suggests that many of these
social judgments are actually made entirely automatically,
that is, without any conscious deliberation or intent (Bargh
and Chartrand 1999; Devine 1989; Hassin, Uleman, and
Bargh 2005). This automatic “social intelligence” appears
to be supported by specific cognitive and neural mechanisms
(Winston et al. 2002), especially in the area of facial per-
ception (Kanwisher and Yovel 2006). The amygdala region,
in particular, appears to play a central role in making au-
tomatic socially relevant judgments on the basis of facial
appearances (Adolphs, Tranel, and Damasio 1998; Winston
et al. 2002). Indeed, Todorov and Engel (2008) argue that
a primary function of the amygdala may be to provide con-
tinuous vigilance by evaluating objects and agents prior to
interacting with them and that one way this is achieved is
by automatically evaluating the valence of faces (see also
Amaral 2002; Whalen 1998). Once rendered, these valence
evaluations are then used to guide approach/avoidance be-
haviors (Chen and Bargh 1999).
Of particular relevance to the continuing debate as to the
extent to which judgments can truly be determined entirely
automatically, a notable feature of these apparently auto-
matic face-based judgments is that they originate in a part
of the brain that is neuroanatomically dissociable from the
location where explicit judgments based on facial infor-
mation are made (Critchley et al. 2000). Put differently, in
layman’s terms, automatic (and unconscious) processing of
facial information is potentially unique in that it can actually
be attributed to a specific location in the brain. That evo-
lution has chosen to endow us with such specific capabilities
for automatic facial processing only serves to reinforce our
contention that marketers would be wise to pay greater at-
tention to how the implicit processing of facial information
might influence consumer behavior.
From a marketing perspective, a particularly important
insight from this body of research is that individuals appear
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to automatically categorize faces in terms of their perceived
trustworthiness (Engell et al. 2007). Indeed, when assessing
unfamiliar faces, trust ratings have been demonstrated to
provide the best approximation of the core underlying va-
lence evaluation (Oosterhof and Todorov 2008). This ca-
pability enables individuals to form judgments about a novel
individual’s trustworthiness after as little as a 50-millisecond
exposure to their face (Todorov, Pakrashi, and Oosterhof
2009; Willis and Todorov 2006). Moreover, the social con-
sequences of these rapid automatic judgments are not re-
stricted to trust ratings in the laboratory. For example, rat-
ings of competence based solely on a 1-second exposure to
faces of unfamiliar political candidates were shown to pre-
dict 69% of the 2004 US Senate races and to be linearly
related to the margins of victory (Todorov et al. 2005).
It is important to note, however, that while at this point
a fairly significant body of research has demonstrated that
automatic valenced judgments can be made on the basis of
facial features alone, much of the research to date has (un-
derstandably) been phenomenological in nature, with less
emphasis having been placed on understanding precisely
how these judgments are arrived at. Put simply, while we
know that automatic valence judgments are made, we know
a lot less about the specific inferential processes that underlie
them. While not the central focus of this article, we note
that there are a number of different possible facial cues that
automatic judgments might rely on. Such cues include facial
expressions (Critchley et al. 2000), the actual physical struc-
ture of the face (Carre, McCormick, and Mondloch 2009),
and resemblance to a specific known individual (Verosky
and Todorov 2010).
DIGITAL MORPHING RESEARCH
Digital morphing technology, which enables photographs
of two individuals to be blended together into a highly re-
alistic-looking virtual face, has provided researchers with a
new technique with which to explore the implicit aspects of
facial processing. For example, Bailenson et al. (2009) ex-
amined participant responses to composite images created by
morphing the faces of politicians with the faces of participants
themselves (henceforth “self-morphing”) in a ratio of 60%
politician, 40% participant. This ratio is significant, as the
authors demonstrate that it produces composite faces within
which individuals could not perceive their own image. Put
differently, participants universally believed they were view-
ing unaltered pictures of the politicians in question. However,
attitudes toward the composites reflected an entirely different
story. When the candidate was relatively unfamiliar to them
(e.g., the 2006 Florida gubernatorial candidates for non-Flor-
ida residents), participants consistently demonstrated stronger
relative preference for the morphed images containing ele-
ments of their own faces.
Moving beyond unfamiliar politicians, Bailenson et al.
demonstrated that this self-morphing effect similarly influ-
enced assessments of the 2004 presidential candidates made
by weak partisans and independents (though it had no effect
on strong partisans). These positive assessments once again
accrued to the self-morphed images without any participants
reporting recognition of their own face, suggesting that they
occurred automatically, and that any recognition that did occur
was entirely implicit. Nor is this positive effect of self-morph-
ing limited to simple liking alone. In research that directly
aligns with the neuroscientific work on automatic trust as-
sessment, DeBruine (2002) used a very similar morphing
manipulation to demonstrate that individuals playing a com-
puter-based sequential trust game were more likely to trust a
player represented by a self-morphed avatar.
While these findings demonstrate that individuals have a
clear preference for self-morphed images, major questions re-
main about the specific process underlying this effect, which
makes it hard to fully assess the extent of the potential mar-
keting relevance. In particular, a broad theoretical question is
whether the observed preference for self-morphed images was
driven by narrow perceptions of similarity (i.e., by resemblance
to the self specifically) or by a broader familiarity-based process
(i.e., by resemblance to a familiar individual, of which the self
is but one example), since the two are essentially confounded
when morphing an individual’s own face into a composite
image. As Bailenson et al. (2009, 938) state, “facial similarity
and familiarity are difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle.”
This theoretical distinction has genuine practical significance,
as while technology might enable limited use of individuals’
own faces (or elements of their own faces) in personally-tar-
geted messages, such self-endorsing strategies are highly prob-
lematic to scale to mass media advertising and may in any case
cross the privacy line for many consumers. However, subtle
manipulation of facial familiarity, should it prove possible, is
innately more scalable, assuming that the familiarity manipu-
lation relies on a cue that is likely to be broadly efficacious.
From a purely applied perspective, the self-morphing find-
ings raise the possibility that automatic facial processing
may considerably influence consumer behaviors in ways that
are currently entirely overlooked by marketers. For example,
while digital manipulation of images is certainly nothing
new to advertisers, the default focus is almost exclusively
on attractiveness, with models being “airbrushed and digi-
tally manipulated beyond the human plane” (Ives 2008, 17).
However, both the Bailenson at al. (2009) and the DeBruine
(2002) findings suggest that attractiveness (for which both
sets of authors controlled) may be too narrow a lens through
which to consider the full implications of how consumers
automatically process faces. As such, we believe that there
are both theoretical and practical reasons for attempting to
deepen our understanding of the roles played by familiarity
and similarity in the automatic evaluation of faces. In the
next section, we use the existing self-morphing findings to
frame a broader discussion outlining different theoretical
accounts that could explain how consciously imperceptible
facial cues might automatically influence how faces are per-
ceived.
A Similarity-Based Account
Both Bailenson et al. (2009) and DeBruine (2002) suggest
that automatically perceived similarity to the self underlies the
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positive preference for self-morphed images they observed.
Certainly social psychologists have long observed that indi-
viduals have a preference for people similar to themselves,
being more helpful toward them (Park and Schaller 2005),
judging them as more attractive and persuasive (Shanteau and
Nagy 1979), and even favoring them in adoption decisions
(DeBruine 2004a). Moreover, evolutionary psychology sug-
gests a specific reason to explain this preference for similarity:
since visual similarity is a cue of potential genetic kinship, then
treating similar others preferentially is one strategy to improve
the likelihood of survival of the broader family group. Con-
sistent with this logic, humans and other primates do appear
capable of recognizing unfamiliar kin (Parr and de Waal 1999;
Wells 1987). This skill likely relies on a visual form of phe-
notype matching, which is the ability to detect the outward
manifestations of a specific genotype (Hauber and Sherman
2001). This ability to automatically recognize kin certainly
suggests that (automatically) perceived facial similarity could
underlie the positive effects observed to accrue to self-morphed
images.
Familiarity-Based Accounts
While the aforementioned similarity-based account has
the potential to explain the self-morphed findings, in this
article we explore the possibility of a broader familiarity-
based account. Such an account would suggest that morph-
ing an unknown face with the face of a familiar (but ge-
netically unrelated) individual would have the potential to
similarly influence how individuals perceive the resulting
composite face. To be absolutely clear, we use the term
“familiarity-based account” broadly to encompass any pro-
cess that involves an individual being influenced by virtue
of their prior exposure to the specific face in question. In
our view, the influence of such familiarity could potentially
occur with at least three distinct levels of specificity and/
or recognition.
Perceptual Fluency-Based Account. One of the most ro-
bust findings in social psychology is that repeated exposure
to almost any stimulus increases preference for it. This mere-
exposure effect (Zajonc 1968) has proven to be highly robust
and persists even when the repeated exposures occur outside
of conscious awareness (Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc 1980).
Most accounts of the mere-exposure effect suggest that per-
ceptual fluency (the subjective feeling of ease when pro-
cessing information) increases with repeated exposure to a
stimulus and enhances preference either by being misattrib-
uted to liking (Bornstein and D’Agostino 1994; Schwarz
2004) or by generating positive affect that directly enhances
stimuli evaluations (Winkielman and Cacioppo 2001). As
far as potentially explaining preference for self-morphed
images is concerned, the reality is that since the invention
of the mirror most humans are repeatedly exposed to their
own faces, and as such the positive perceptions observed
to accrue to self-morphed images could potentially be ex-
plained by the increased perceptual fluency that comes from
familiarity with one’s own face.
Valence Accessibility Account. A pure perceptual fluency-
based account for automatic facial processing suggests that an
unknown face morphed with a familiar face would be bene-
ficially evaluated due solely to its increased familiarity, not
because any particular individual-specific meaning or valence
associated with the familiar face is perceived (i.e., a fluency
process does not rely on specific recognition). From an evo-
lutionary perspective, however, one might imagine that such a
process could be maladaptive. For example, if an unknown
individual resembled a known threat, then despite their famil-
iarity, the appropriate automatic reaction would presumably be
to not trust and/or avoid this individual. More adaptive, then,
would be for implicit recognition to enable the individual to
automatically perceive some level of approach-avoid motiva-
tion. Indeed, this possibility is consistent with fundamental re-
search on primitive approach-avoid motivations, which, de-
pending on the exigencies of the current situation, are thought
to govern the deployment of predispositions to approach or
withdraw (Bargh 1997; Neumann and Strack 2000). Moreover,
visual cues are one likely trigger of these motivational systems
(Neumann and Strack 2000), which accords with the research
in neuroscience suggesting that the amygdala preconsciously
evaluates the valence of a face (Amaral 2002; Whalen 1998).
This suggests a second familiarity-orientated explanation for
participants’ observed positive preference toward self-morphs
—namely, that some level of implicit recognition of their own
faces may have led them to experience similar approach-avoid
motivations toward the self-morphs as they would with full
conscious exposure to their own image. Since the majority of
(nondepressed) individuals are positively self-disposed, auto-
matically perceived approach motivations could certainly ex-
plain the positive ratings assigned to self-morphed images. We
refer to this possible process as a valence accessibility
account—that implicit recognition of a familiar individual in
a morphed face is sufficient to enable an underlying (and pre-
existing) valence judgment of the familiar individual to be
automatically perceived.
Trait Accessibility Account. A third possibility is that im-
plicit recognition of a familiar individual in a morphed image
is sufficient for an individual not only to perceive a broad
approach/avoid motivation specific to the known individual but
also to automatically access more specific trait-based assess-
ments about that person from memory. If implicit recognition
does enable trait assessments to be automatically accessed from
memory, then since most individuals view themselves as being
above average on many dimensions (Alicke et al. 1995), full
implicit recognition could also explain the positive trait ratings
assigned to self-morphed images. We refer to this final pos-
sibility as a trait accessibility account—the possibility that im-
plicit recognition of a familiar face actually enables specific
trait beliefs of the specific individual to be automatically ac-
cessed from memory.
In summary, at a high level, two broad accounts exist for
the positive preference observed to accrue to self-morphed
images (Bailenson et al. 2009; DeBruine 2002). First, con-
sistent with an innate ability to recognize our own kin, it is
possible that an automatically perceived perception of sim-
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ilarity (to the self) was the primary mediating process. Sec-
ond, implicit perceptions of familiarity (as opposed to sim-
ilarity to the self specifically) may have driven the observed
effects. Such perceptions of familiarity could operate with
varying levels of actual implicit recognition. First, a fluency-
based account suggests that generally perceived familiarity
(i.e., with no specific recognition of the familiar individual)
could influence preference for morphed images via increased
perceptual fluency. Second, a valence accessibility account
suggests that implicit individual-specific recognition may
occur (i.e., of the self in the self-morph studies reported) at
a level sufficient to enable individuals to access a basic
approach/avoid judgment (henceforth “valence judgment”)
of the individual concerned. Finally, a trait accessibility ac-
count would suggest that this implicit recognition might
actually be sufficient to access specific trait information from
memory.
Of note, a similarity-based account would suggest that the
positive preference observed to accrue to self-morphed images
(Bailenson et al. 2009; DeBruine 2002) would not extend to
morphed images containing familiar faces. However, all of the
familiarity-based processes discussed above would predict that
similar preferences might also be observed for faces morphed
to contain familiar faces. As such, while in this article we do
not attempt to specifically rule out a unique similarity-based
process, a primary goal was to establish whether a broader
familiarity-based process might operate. Second, while it is not
clear that the three familiarity-based accounts discussed above
should necessarily be entirely mutually exclusive, a secondary
goal was to begin to understand the relative merits of each,
especially in the context of the facial morphing paradigm.
Research Overview
Four studies explore the effects of morphing unfamiliar faces
with the faces of highly familiar celebrities (Tiger Woods and
George W. Bush). Consistent with a familiarity-driven process
(and inconsistent with a pure similarity-based explanation),
these studies demonstrate that adding imperceptible celeb-
rity facial cues to pictures of unfamiliar people increases
participants’ perceived trustworthiness in (studies 1 and 2A)
and reported likelihood to buy from (study 3) the individuals
pictured. Furthermore, this effect appears consistent with a
valence accessibility account; that is, it involves a level of
implicit recognition that appears to be sufficient to enable
a broad approach/avoid evaluation of the underlying celeb-
rity to be perceived (study 2B). However, it is inconsistent
with accounts based on trait accessibility (study 2A) or per-
ceptual fluency (studies 2B and 3).
STUDY 1: TRUSTING A CELEBRITY-
MORPHED IMAGE
Study 1 was designed to provide an initial test of whether
subtly incorporating elements of a familiar celebrity image
into an unfamiliar face can lead the resulting composite
image to be perceived as more trustworthy than the original
face. To do this we compare the trustworthiness of an un-
familiar face to the same unfamiliar face digitally blended
with the face of Tiger Woods. Tiger was chosen because we
expected him to be highly familiar to our participants. Of
note, all data was collected before the Tiger Woods scandal
materialized. We chose to focus on trust for several reasons.
First, much of the neuroscientific work on automatic trait
assessment has identified perceptions of trust as being sig-
nificantly determined by facial properties (e.g., Engell et al.
2007) and to proxy an underlying valence judgment (Oos-
terhof and Todorov 2008). Second, trust has long been iden-
tified as a critical marketing variable, influencing firm met-
rics as diverse as salesman performance (Doney and Cannon
1997), the efficacy of celebrity endorsers (Ohanian 1990),
and ultimately perceptions of the brand itself (Ambler 1997;
Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001).
Design and Method
Study 1 randomly assigned 109 undergraduate partici-
pants to either a Tiger-morph condition or a control-morph
condition in a single-factor between-subjects design. Par-
ticipants were instructed to spend a few moments looking
at a picture of a face and then to record their impressions
of the trustworthiness of the individual pictured on an 11-
point scale anchored from 5 (well below average) to 5
(well above average). Participants were asked to not over-
think the exercise and to rely on their gut instincts and
immediate reactions. In the Tiger-morph condition, a com-
posite face was created by digitally blending a stock model
face with the face of Tiger Woods. In the control-morph
condition, the same stock model face was digitally blended
with the face of an individual chosen to be of approximately
similar age and attractiveness to Tiger Woods. Using a con-
trol image that has itself been created using a digital blending
process is required to ensure that any observed effects could
not be attributable to the effect of morphing alone, since
composite faces (which are more symmetrical) have been
shown to be perceived as being more attractive than the
source faces from which they are constructed (Langlois and
Roggman 1990). Furthermore, “the what is beautiful is
good” stereotype (Dion, Berscheid, and Walster 1972) would
suggest a possible link between such morph-induced at-
tractiveness and subsequent trait ratings. As such, to ensure
both facial morphs were indeed perceived as being similar
in attractiveness, we conducted a pretest (N p 75) utilizing
an 11-point scale anchored from 5 (very unattractive) to
5 (very attractive) that revealed no differences in the per-
ceived attractiveness of the two faces (MTiger_morph p 3.64,
Mcontrol_morph p 3.68; t(73) p .17, p p .86). The original
and composite faces are shown in figure 1.
Both composite images (henceforth the “Tiger-morph” and
“control-morph” images) were created using Abrosoft Fanta
Morph Pro 4 software and were composed of 65% of the
unfamiliar stock model face and 35% of either Tiger Woods’s
face or the control face. The morphing process involves mark-
ing corresponding points at standard landmarks on both faces
(such as the corners of the eyes and mouth), which allows
the software to generate a composite face from a weighted
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FIGURE 1
CONSTRUCTION OF FACES USED IN STUDY 1
average of landmark-specific parameters of the source faces.
While prior morphing research has demonstrated that indi-
viduals are unable to consciously recognize themselves in
composite images containing 40% of their own face (Bailen-
son et al. 2009; DeBruine 2004b), we conservatively chose
to use the 65 : 35 ratio in order to minimize the chance of
conscious recognition.
Once participants had provided their trustworthiness rat-
ing, they completed a funnel debriefing (Bargh and Chart-
rand 2000) that first asked if there was anything odd or
unusual about the face pictured, then asked if the face re-
minded them of anyone they knew, before finally providing
an open-ended opportunity to report if the face looked like
anyone famous.
Results and Discussion
First, we considered the funnel debriefing data to assess
possible differences in how the faces were perceived be-
tween conditions. While 16 participants reported that the
face they viewed was odd, there was no difference in the
percentage reporting this between the control-morph con-
dition (13%) and the Tiger-morph condition (17%; x2(1) p
.34, p p .56). Of greater importance, none of the expla-
nations for the faces looking odd betrayed any underlying
suspicion of the morphed nature of the faces pictured. In
fact, the explanations offered were universally entirely un-
related to the experimental manipulation and included such
reasons as “smiling too much” and “eyes a little closed.”
As far as general (conscious) perceptions of familiarity were
concerned, we observed no differences across the two con-
ditions, with 22% of participants in both conditions indi-
cating that the face they viewed reminded them of someone
they knew (x2(1) p .003, p p .96). However, none of the
individuals (in either condition) who suggested the face was
familiar indicated that it resembled Tiger Woods; instead,
they tended to suggest that the face resembled someone they
had a personal relationship with. As such it appears that, at
least as far as conscious recognition is concerned, there was
no difference in either general perceptions of familiarity or
specific recognition of Tiger Woods between the two com-
posite faces.
However, despite participants in the two conditions re-
porting the two images as being equally familiar, their re-
ported trust ratings revealed a different pattern. In fact par-
ticipants in the Tiger-morph condition rated the face as being
more trustworthy (M p 1.75) than did participants in the
control-morph condition (M p 0.95; t(107) p 2.2, p !
.05). Thus it appeared that subtly incorporating elements of
a highly familiar face into an otherwise unfamiliar image
increased perceived trust in the pictured individual. These
initial data thus conceptually mirror the prior research, which
has demonstrated positive changes in perceptions of the
trustworthiness of self-morphed images (DeBruine 2002,
2004b). However, unlike the self, which is both similar and
familiar, Tiger Woods is highly unlikely to be on average
similar in appearance to our participant population. As a
result, these data are more consistent with a broader famil-
iarity-based process as underlying the positive perceptions
of the trustworthiness of the Tiger-morphed image.
While our chosen focus was trust, a natural question to
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FIGURE 2
FACES USED IN STUDY 2
ask is whether the observed effect is unique to trust or might
generalize to other trait assessments. To explore this question
we ran a replicate experiment with 35 MBA students who
rated trustworthiness, liking, and athletic ability of the same
two faces used in the main study. The only difference in
procedure was that 1–10 scales were used (as opposed to
5 to 5). Not only did these data reveal a (marginally)
significant replication of the prior trust result (MTiger p 5.3,
Mcontrol p 4.0; t(31) p 1.9, p ! .07) but a similar result
was also observed for reported liking (MTiger p 5.3, Mcontrol
p 3.8; t(31) p 2.1, p ! .05). Furthermore, the trust and
liking ratings were themselves very highly correlated (r p
.96, p ! .01), with a significant number of participants ac-
tually reporting the exact same score for both trust and lik-
ing. However, we observed no difference in reported athletic
ability between the two face conditions (MTiger p 7.1, Mcontrol
p 7.4; t(31) p 0.51, p 1 .6), and we also observed no
correlation between the athletic ability ratings and the ratings
of either trust or liking (both p 1 .4).
These follow-up data enable us to draw a number of ad-
ditional conclusions. First, the fact that participants did not
report the Tiger-morph to be more athletic provides initial
evidence against a full trait accessibility account, as presum-
ably if implicit recognition was sufficient to enable full trait
accessibility from memory, then this would have led to higher
athletic ratings of the Tiger-morph. This conclusion is ad-
mittedly a little speculative, however, as we did not measure
our participant’s beliefs about the athletic ability of Tiger
Woods, and it is certainly possible (perhaps due to golf not
being perceived as being a physically intense sport) that our
participants simply did not perceive Woods to be especially
athletic. Second, the reported liking data clearly suggest that
the observed positive effect is not specific to trust and likely
generalizes to a variety of general personality assessments.
We believe that this result is consistent with a valence ac-
cessibility account, as it appears likely that automatically per-
ceived positive valence would manifest via individuals mak-
ing positive assessment of broad personality-type variables
rather than simply trustworthiness alone (e.g., liking or hon-
esty).
STUDY 2A: EXPLORING A TRAIT
ACCESSIBILITY EXPLANATION
Study 2A was designed to build on study 1 in a number
of ways. First, in order to generalize the results of study 1,
we switch to a different highly familiar figure: George W.
Bush. Second, in order to address possible concerns that the
results in study 1 might have been driven primarily by the
morph-control image (i.e., by some idiosyncratic negative
feature of the control face), we include two control conditions
in study 2: the original unaltered model face as well as a
control-morph using an individual of similar age and attrac-
tiveness to George Bush. Finally, while no participants ex-
plicitly recognized Tiger Woods in study 1, implicit recog-
nition may well have taken place. As previously discussed,
such implicit recognition might have enabled either a broad
valence judgment of Woods to be accessed or even for specific
trait beliefs held about him to be perceived in the morphed
image (though the athletic rating data provided preliminary
data suggesting that this is unlikely). To better rule out the
latter possibility, in study 2A we also collected participants’
actual ratings of the trustworthiness of George W. Bush.
Design and Method
Study 2 randomly assigned 179 undergraduate partici-
pants to either a Bush-morph condition, a control-morph
condition, or an unaltered-face condition in a single-factor
between-subjects design. In the two morph conditions, com-
posite faces were created by blending the stock model face
(same face as study 1) with either 35% of the face of George
W. Bush or 35% of a control face chosen to be of similar
age and attractiveness to Bush. Participants in the unaltered
face condition viewed the original unaltered stock model
face. As in study 1, a pretest (N p 66) suggested that the
two morphed faces were equally attractive (MBush_morph p
3.62, Mcontrol_morph p 3.73; t(64) p .53, p p .60). The un-
altered face and both composite faces used are shown in
figure 2.
All other aspects of the experiment were identical to study
1 except that in a supposedly unrelated study participants
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subsequently rated the trustworthiness of six celebrities (in-
cluding George W. Bush) on the same 11-point scale.
Results and Discussion
First, we considered the funnel debriefing data and once
again observed no reliable differences in conscious per-
ceptions of familiarity across the three conditions (per-
centage reporting face resembled someone they knew:
Bush-morph 28%; control-morph 19%; neutral image 15%;
x2(2) p 2.50, p p .29). As far as specific recognition of
George Bush was concerned, none of the participants in
any condition suggested that the face they viewed re-
minded them of George Bush.
Turning to our primary dependent measure of interest,
there was once again an overall effect of face condition on
reported trust (F(2, 176) p 4.56, p ! .02). A planned com-
parison revealed that this effect was primarily driven by
participants in the Bush-morph condition rating the face as
being significantly more trustworthy (M p 2.16) than either
participants in the unaltered face condition (M p 1.27) or
the control-morph condition (M p 1.30; t(176) p 3.02,
p ! .01). There was no difference in perceived trust between
the control-morph and unaltered-face conditions (t(176) p
.08, p 1 .90). Next we considered whether participants’ trust
ratings in the Bush-morph condition were related to their
actual beliefs about the trustworthiness of George Bush. This
did not appear to be the case; in fact in the Bush-morph
condition, ratings of trustworthiness of the composite face
were essentially uncorrelated with actual ratings of the trust-
worthiness of George Bush (r p .07, p p .62). Thus, in
addition to not being consciously recognized, any implicit
recognition that may have been taking place was apparently
not sufficient for specific beliefs about Bush’s trustworthi-
ness to be perceived in the morphed image.
While these data rule out a trait accessibility account, that
is, the possibility that implicit recognition enables specific
trait assessments to be accessed from memory, they do not
speak to the alternative possibility that an intermediary level
of implicit recognition might exist, one sufficient to perceive
an overall valence judgment of the individual in question (i.e.,
whether to approach or avoid them) but insufficient to access
preexisting beliefs about specific traits. Recall that, when as-
sessing faces believed to be unknown, trust ratings have been
demonstrated to provide a good approximation of automati-
cally made valence evaluations of faces (Oosterhof and To-
dorov 2008). By this account, the positive trust ratings as-
signed to the Bush-morph might have reflected automatically
perceived perceptions of positive valence (i.e., that an ap-
proach motivation was induced). However, it was impossible
for us to assess an overall valence explanation for the study
2A data, as we had no independent measure of whether Bush
might trigger an approach or avoid motivation in our partic-
ipants. Certainly, despite his rather mixed reputation (both
across traits and between individuals), we would also expect
Bush to be inextricably associated with the primary role for
which he is known, that of president of the United States
(McCracken 1989). As such, his close association with the
presidency suggests that implicit recognition of him in a com-
posite image might be expected to automatically cue ap-
proach-consistent concepts such as freedom and safety, thus
leading to a positive valance appraisal of the composite image.
However, rather than simply speculate about the possibility
of a positive approach motivation, we designed study 2B to
explore if we could measure this directly.
STUDY 2B: EXPLORING A VALENCE
ACCESSIBILITY EXPLANATION
Study 2B had two main goals. First, we wanted to in-
vestigate whether the results of study 2A could be attributed
to the Bush-morph image inducing an approach motivation
in our participants. Second, we wanted to rule out a pure
fluency-based explanation for the results of studies 1 and
2A (i.e., that the presence of the Woods or Bush facial cues
led to increased fluency in processing the morphed images,
with this fluency then being misattributed to the trust and
liking ratings). The study utilized a modified version of a
methodology used by Mehta and Zhu (2009) to evidence
that the color red induces an avoid motivation while the
color blue invokes an approach motivation. Specifically,
these authors demonstrated that a blue/(red) background fa-
cilitated participants solving anagrams based on approach-
/(avoid-) related words. In this study, instead of manipulat-
ing the background color, we located the appropriate
anagrams directly beneath either the Bush-morph or the con-
trol-morph image from study 2A.
Design and Method
Four hundred and forty-five participants from a general
online panel participated in this study for payment. The
study was designed as a 2 (face presented: Bush-morph vs.
control-morph) # 2 (solve time: control vs. approach related
words) mixed design, with the second factor being the
within-subject factor. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of the two face-presented conditions, and the study
was administered via computer. Participants were told that
the researchers were interested in how people solve ana-
grams in the presence of another person and that in this first
study they would simply be asked to solve a series of an-
agrams presented underneath pictures of faces. It was also
explained that the first one or two letters of the target word
would be underlined in the letter string and an example
(ATSKABREF for which the solution is BREAKFAST) was
presented. Finally, participants were instructed to write
“don’t know” if they could not solve a given anagram within
2 minutes.
Next, participants proceeded to attempt to solve nine an-
agrams, each of which were presented on a separate screen.
Six of the anagrams represented control words (i.e., count,
ranch), while three were associated with an approach mo-
tivation (i.e., advance, adventure). The presentation order of
the anagrams was randomized. Depending on the condition,
each anagram appeared on the screen directly below either
the Bush-morph or the control-morph image from study 2A.
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Results and Discussion
First, for each participant, we calculated their average
solve time for control and approach words. Only correctly
solved anagrams were included in the average calculations,
and data from participants who got one or fewer words
correct (in either category) were discarded. As a result, data
from 45 participants were excluded from further analyses,
leaving useable data for 397 participants.
These computed average solve times were then used in
a 2 (face presented: Bush-morph vs. control-morph) # 2
(solve time: control words vs. approach words) repeated
measures ANOVA, which revealed a significant interaction
(F(1, 395) p 4.50, p ! .04). A planned comparison revealed
that participants who viewed the Bush-morph solved the
approach-related anagrams significantly faster (M p 14.2
seconds) than did those who viewed the control-morph (M
p 16.9 seconds, p ! .04) but that there was no difference
in the speed with which the control anagrams were solved
(MBush-morph p 15.2 seconds, Mcontrol-morph p 15.1 seconds; p
p .95). These data thus build on the findings from study
2A by revealing that exposure to the Bush-morph image
appeared to induce an approach motivation in participants.
Put differently, participants appeared to implicitly recognize
Bush in the morphed image to an extent sufficient to access
a positive valence judgment. As such, these data support a
valence accessibility account, that is, that the positive trust
ratings observed to accrue to the Bush-morph in study 2A
were attributable to an automatically induced approach mo-
tivation. Moreover, these data are very hard to reconcile
with a pure fluency-based account, as not only is it rather
problematic to explain why increased fluency in processing
an image would influence the solve times of anagrams po-
sitioned adjacent to that image, but we can think of no reason
why such an effect would only pertain to approach-related
words.
STUDY 3: LIKELIHOOD TO BUY FROM A
TIGER WOODS–MORPHED IMAGE
The first three studies demonstrated that blending a fa-
miliar (but not similar) face into an otherwise unfamiliar
face can produce a composite face that is rated as being
more trustworthy and likeable than the original. This effect
on perceived trustworthiness obtained despite a complete
lack of apparent recognition of the presence of the familiar
image in the composite image. The original goal of study
3 was to begin to explore whether this “hijacking” of fa-
miliarity has the potential to affect behaviors of specific
interest to marketers. As such, in study 3 we again use a
Tiger-morphed image to examine whether the morphing pro-
cedure could influence perceived likelihood to buy from a
pictured salesperson. Rather serendipitously, data were col-
lected in two time periods: both before and at the peak of
the Tiger Woods scandal. This enabled us to further explore
the valence accessibility account we have argued underlies
the results to date and to rule out explanations based on
facial structure or expression alone.
Design and Method
Study 3 randomly assigned 319 undergraduate partici-
pants to either a Tiger-morph condition or a control-morph
condition. In the Tiger-morph condition, a composite face
was created by digitally blending a stock model face with
the face of Tiger Woods. In the control-morph condition,
the same stock model face was digitally blended with the
face of an individual chosen to be of approximately similar
age and attractiveness to Tiger Woods. As before, Tiger and
the similarly attractive/aged face represented 35% of the
respective morphed images. The stock model face in this
study was a neutral image of a salesperson pictured from
the chest upward. The original salesman image and both
composite faces are shown in figure 3. Participant instruc-
tions were identical to those of studies 1 and 2A except that
instead of rating trustworthiness they were asked to rate how
likely they would be to buy from the pictured salesman on
an 11-point scale anchored from 5 (very unlikely) to 5
(very likely).
The data were collected in two tranches. The first tranche
(167 participants) was collected in the last week of Septem-
ber 2009, before the Tiger Woods scandal emerged. The
second tranche (152 participants) was collected in the second
week of December 2009, when the Tiger Woods scandal
was at its peak and was almost completely dominating the
media. Thus study 3 was a 2 face presented (Tiger-morph
vs. control-morph) # 2 timing (pre-scandal vs. post-scan-
dal) between-subjects design.
Results
Results indicated no main effect of face presented or tim-
ing but a significant interaction between the two (F(1, 318)
p 12.01, p !. 001). As shown in figure 4, while pre-scandal
participants indicated that they were more likely to buy from
the Tiger-morph than from the control-morph (MTiger-morph p
1.46, Mcontrol-morph p 1.04), this pattern reversed itself post-
scandal (MTiger-morph p .11, Mcontrol-morph p 1.02). Of note,
given the particular nature of the scandal, there were no
effects of gender.
Discussion
Despite a complete lack of conscious recognition of Tiger
Woods, assessments of the likelihood to buy from the Tiger-
morphed salesman appeared to be significantly influenced by
the precipitous decline in Woods’s real world reputation. This
result is consistent with an associative learning/evaluative con-
ditioning view of the scandal (DeHouwer, Thomas, and Bae-
yens 2001). Specifically, the (highly negative) scandal appears
to have acted as an affective stimulus, which, since it was paired
with Tiger Woods, was sufficient to change valence judgments
of him. Furthermore, implicit recognition of Tiger was appar-
ently sufficient to access these valence judgments. Of note, the
fact that we observed a valence judgment being influenced by
behaviors undertaken by the individual in question strongly
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FACES USED IN STUDY 3
FIGURE 4
WILLINGNESS TO BUY FROM SALESMAN AS A FUNCTION OF
FACE PRESENTED AND SCANDAL TIMING
suggests that this judgment is related to the actual identity (i.e.,
Tiger Woods) of the known individual in the morphed image.
This distinction is important, as while study 2B revealed
that the Bush-morph appeared to induce an approach moti-
vation in participants, the data were entirely silent as far as
the actual cause of that motivation is concerned. Put differ-
ently, when discussing implicit recognition of the individual
in the morphed images (i.e., Woods or Bush), to this point
we have essentially made an assumption that a valence ac-
cessibility account involves implicit recognition of the celeb-
rities’ facial properties sufficient for the perceiver to access
a valence judgment of that specific individual in particular.
However, an alternative possibility is that there is something
about the facial structure of these two individuals (or even,
possibly, of their specific expressions in the photos of them
we used) that in and of itself drove our results to date (i.e.,
independent of their unique identities). For example, the pos-
sibility exists that both Bush’s and Woods’s facial features
fit a genetic pattern generally perceived to appear more trust-
worthy or approachable. However, since in study 3 we utilized
the exact same Tiger-morph image at two points in time, the
observed difference in participant ratings across these two
points in time cannot be solely due to some idiosyncratic
feature of Woods’s facial structure itself or of his specific
facial expression in the photo we used to create the morph.
Also of note, these results mirror study 2B in that they are
very hard to reconcile with a pure fluency-based process. In-
deed, we note that a fluency-based account might actually pre-
dict the opposite result as, despite Woods being arguably the
world’s most recognizable sports celebrity, the obsessive cov-
erage of the scandal presumably could only have led partici-
pants in the post-scandal condition to be exposed to additional
images of Tiger Woods. This repeated exposure should, all
other things aside, have increased their fluency in processing
the Tiger-morph, leading to enhanced preference. Certainly,
even though one might argue that the relatively short duration
of the scandal might be insufficient to make much positive
difference to an individual’s fluency in processing Woods’s
image, it is problematic for a fluency account to explain a
decline in how Tiger was rated. Thus these data not only suggest
that participants were implicitly recognizing Tiger Woods to a
degree sufficient to access an overall valence judgment of him
but that this implicitly perceived valence was sufficient to over-
come the possible opposing effect of fluency.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current research provides the first demonstration of
the important finding that our impressions of unfamiliar
faces can be influenced by digitally morphing them with
those of highly familiar figures. Study 1 showed that digi-
tally blending an unfamiliar face with 35% of the face of
Tiger Woods resulted in a composite face that was perceived
as more trustworthy (and in the replicate more likeable) than
the original face. This effect occurred despite 100% of our
participants failing to identify any resemblance between the
Tiger-morphed face and Tiger Woods himself. Study 2A
both replicated this result with a different celebrity (George
W. Bush) and additionally demonstrated that participants’
ratings of the trustworthiness of the Bush-morphed image
were uncorrelated with their consciously held beliefs about
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Bush’s actual trustworthiness. These data were thus incon-
sistent with a trait accessibility account, as it did not appear
that participants were implicitly recognizing Bush to an ex-
tent sufficient to automatically perceive specific trait as-
sessments of him.
Study 2B built on this result by demonstrating that the
Bush-morph image appeared to induce an approach moti-
vation in participants, a result consistent with a valence ac-
cessibility account, that is, the idea that implicit recognition
is sufficient only to access an overall valence judgment of
the known individual concerned (Todorov and Engel 2008).
Study 3 expanded on this finding by revealing that a marked
decline in Tiger Woods’s overall reputation appeared to neg-
atively influence how a Tiger-morphed composite face was
perceived, a result that suggests that overall valence judg-
ments of morphed faces are (at least partially) determined by
actual perceptions of the specific individual concerned rather
than by some non-individual-specific aspect of their facial
expression or facial structure. A second contribution of studies
2B and 3 was that they served to rule out a pure fluency-
based explanation, as it is very hard to reconcile a fluency-
based account with the pattern of data we observed in these
studies.
It is important to note that all these results were obtained
without a single participant in any condition (celebrity-morph
or otherwise) ever consciously suggesting resemblance to the
celebrity in the composite image. As such, it is worth high-
lighting that all these results were observed using a manip-
ulation of facial imagery that is subtle enough to universally
elude conscious awareness. Also worthy of note, with the
exception of the post-scandal likelihood-to-buy rating for the
Tiger-morph in study 3, all the ratings our participants pro-
vided (for all the faces presented) were positive in an absolute
sense (i.e., greater than the midpoint of the scale). This result,
which may seem a little probabilistically surprising, is actually
broadly consistent with the work of Cacioppo and colleagues
on the positivity offset (Cacioppo, Gardner, and Bernston
1999). Cacioppo argues that neutral stimuli actually tend to
induce a weak approach motivation, which he suggests serves
to motivate an organism to explore and learn about the en-
vironment (since novel stimuli may otherwise not be ap-
proached). As such, the finding that truly unknown faces (e.g.,
our control faces) are positively rated is consistent with the
idea that exposure to them induced a weak approach moti-
vation in our participants (and thus is consistent with a valence
assessment process more generally).
Theoretical Contributions
The current results contribute to the nascent facial morph-
ing literature and to the wider facial processing literature in
several important ways. First, recall that both Bailenson et
al. (2009) and DeBruine (2002, 2004b) demonstrated that,
despite a complete lack of conscious recognition, self-mor-
phed images benefited from enhanced preference compared
to the original unaltered source face. Both sets of authors
primarily attributed this result to automatic perceptions of
similarity. In our studies, we conceptually replicate these find-
ings when we incorporate celebrity faces rather than partic-
ipants’ own images into composite faces. Since the celebrities
we chose (Tiger Woods and George W. Bush) are unlikely
to be similar to our participants, our results are clearly in-
consistent with a perceived similarity account (or more pre-
cisely with a similarity-to-the-self account). While our data
do not explicitly rule out similarity as being a unique factor
in these prior studies, they do suggest that familiarity-based
accounts may have more potential to parsimoniously explain
preference for both self-morphed and celebrity-morphed im-
ages.
Second, turning to familiarity-based accounts specifically,
our work suggests that some measure of implicit recognition
likely contributes to how morphed faces are perceived (be they
self-morphed or celebrity-morphed). While study 2A demon-
strated that participants rating a Bush-morph image were unable
to access specific beliefs about George Bush’s trustworthiness,
study 2B revealed that a broader approach/avoid type evaluation
was possible. Together, studies 2A and 2B combine to sug-
gest that implicit recognition, at least in our facial morph-
ing paradigm, occurs at an intermediary level of specificity.
It appears sufficient to access an overall valence judgment
of the individual in question (as in study 2B) but insuf-
ficient to access more specific trait-based ratings that may
be held and that would be reportable with full conscious
recognition (as in study 2A). Study 3 further supported
this valence accessibility account by demonstrating that an
actual behavior undertaken by a specific individual (i.e.,
Tiger Woods) led to a subsequent change in how an un-
known face (morphed to include Woods’s face) was per-
ceived. As such, these findings resonate with the neuro-
science literature that suggests that a primary function of
the amygdala is to automatically provide a high-level va-
lence-based evaluation of agents prior to interacting with
them (Amaral 2002; Todorov and Engel 2008; Whalen
1998).
Finally, we believe that our data directly contribute to the
rather thin discussion in the literature concerning precisely
how these valence-based evaluations are constructed. As we
emphasized in our introduction, there is surprisingly little
research on the nature of the informational building blocks
from which the implicit evaluations are presumed to be built.
For example, does a specific face induce an approach mo-
tivation (and thus garner high trustworthy ratings) due to a
subtle (and hard to control for) aspect of its particular ex-
pression, due to its chronic structural features (which may
fit a genetic pattern indicative of trust), or because it resem-
bles a specific known individual for whom an overall pos-
itive evaluation exists? While our research is clearly insuf-
ficient to fully characterize what we suspect is a complex
and interdependent set of inferential processes, we do note
that in study 3 the Tiger-morphed face was identical in both
timing conditions. Thus facial expression and idiosyncratic
structural features of the face were both perfectly controlled
for. As such, study 3 suggests that the inferential process
involved appeared to involve sufficient implicit recognition
of a specific individual (Tiger Woods) for an individual-
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specific valence judgment of him to be perceived. Thus,
while in no way ruling out the potential for facial expressions
and structural facial features to also contribute to automatic
judgments, our research does identify that the specific role
resemblance to a known individual can play in determining
automatic valence judgments. Hence, while our experimen-
tal paradigm may have been the digital morphing of faces,
a broader implication is that our automatic attentional re-
sources appear to be extremely sensitive to cues of facial
familiarity. We believe that future research should increas-
ingly focus on better understanding the full range of infer-
ential processes underlying the implicit processing of facial
information. Indeed, this challenge appears to represent a
particularly suitable arena in which neuroscientists and de-
cision scientists could fruitfully collaborate.
Implications for Marketers
At a high level, we believe that the most important im-
plication of our work is that it suggests a general need for
marketers to pay more attention to the full potential con-
sequences of how facial information is automatically pro-
cessed. With facial imagery being such an ever-present cue
in the world of marketing communications, the simple re-
ality is that there is a tremendous variety of circumstances
and contexts where automatic processing of facial stimuli
may influence consumer behaviors of interest. In our view,
while the influence of attractiveness and certain emotional
expressions have received some specific attention, the po-
tentially broader implications of facial familiarity have been
largely unexplored by marketers.
More specifically, these data suggest a novel way for
marketers to use celebrities and highly familiar figures. In-
stead of solely placing them front and center as endorsers,
an alternative way to utilize them is to subtly morph their
faces with those of otherwise unfamiliar stock model im-
ages. Indeed, mirroring the success of “forgotten spokes-
persons” (Weisbuch and Mackie 2009), such a strategy may
even have the potential to outperform explicit use of celeb-
rities in some circumstances. Prior research has demon-
strated that the persuasive impact of spokespersons can be
enhanced when prior exposure cannot be recalled, as this
facilitates misattribution of the perceptual fluency experi-
enced while processing the endorser (Weisbuch, Mackie, and
Garcia-Marques 2003). Put differently, when the endorser
is correctly identified, any effect of fluency is more likely
to be correctly attributed to their fame and familiarity. Sim-
ilarly, we believe it is possible that implicitly perceived
valence judgments of individuals are likely candidates for
misattribution given the absence of conscious awareness of
their source.
As well as this possible valence misattribution, another po-
tential advantage of using celebrity-morphed images is that the
lack of conscious recognition of the celebrity, which we rou-
tinely observed, might also mean persuasion knowledge (Fries-
tad and Wright 1994) is less likely to be activated, which, in
and of itself, might lead to greater potential for successful
persuasion. As such, we believe that there are multiple reasons
to believe that digital morphing may offer marketers a way to
capitalize on celebrities’ familiarity without paying all the costs
(be they to the persuasion process or perhaps financial) of the
attendant fame. We note, however, that the legal ramifications
of using celebrities in morphed images are likely to be rather
complex. While a celebrity owns the rights to the use of his
or her image, it is not entirely clear how these rights might
extend to composite faces containing a minority proportion of
their face, especially when they are not consciously recogniz-
able in the composite (which would also make policing prob-
lematic).
Perhaps, however, some of the benefits of using celebrities
in morphed images might be obtainable without actually
using the actual celebrity in question. Indeed, an intriguing
implication of our work involves the potential for using
celebrity look-alikes in morphed images. If look-alikes are
used directly in an advertising context, then unless their
resemblance to the celebrity of interest is unusually close,
it is likely that consumers will be consciously aware that
the look-alike is not in fact the real deal. This conscious
perception of illegitimacy may interfere with the possible
benefits that might otherwise be expected to (automatically)
accrue from the resemblance. However, if the look-alike is
used in a morphed image, then an interesting possibility is
that this may offer a way to capitalize on the benefits of the
resemblance without the attendant risks of conscious cor-
rection.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
As we noted earlier, when evaluating unknown faces, rat-
ings of trust have previously been demonstrated to be a good
approximation for an overall valence evaluation of a face
(Oosterhof and Todorov 2008). Put differently, when asking
individuals to rate the trustworthiness of an unfamiliar face,
the answer they provide appears to be significantly deter-
mined by an automatically perceived approach/avoid eval-
uation. In essence, then, these trust ratings might be innately
different in nature (they certainly are in terms of their source)
from perceptions of trustworthiness of known people, and
they really are better conceptualized as a proxy for an overall
evaluation of valence. As such, it is important not to over-
state the extent to which such evaluations might influence
consumer behavior in the way that trust (as traditionally
conceptualized and measured) has been shown to do. How-
ever, we believe that study 3 clearly demonstrates the po-
tential for these overall evaluations to affect more than sim-
ple trust ratings and to directly influence consumer behavior.
Certainly, however, one fruitful avenue for future research
is to begin to better delineate the circumstances in which
these automatic evaluations of valence can influence down-
stream consumption behaviors. To give one example, imag-
ine a typical print advertisement that makes some form of
product claim and that includes one or more stock model
images. The question is, would the positive valence that
could be obtained by morphing the model face(s) with a
known figure influence the extent to which the product claim
is attended to and/or believed?
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A second (and related) limitation is that we are some dis-
tance from being able to provide a complete theoretical ac-
count of how morphed faces are perceived and processed. In
particular, in the current research, our primary focus has been
on exploring the extent to which individuals can implicitly
recognize celebrity images in composite faces. We have
placed less emphasis on fluency explanations, although we
note that the results of studies 2B and 3 are entirely incon-
sistent with a purely fluency-based process. That said, since
the manipulation in study 3 was naturally occurring, the re-
sulting consequences for internal validity require us to be
conservative in how we interpret the results. We note, how-
ever, that in very recent research, Verosky and Todorov (2010)
demonstrated a conceptually similar result in a laboratory
environment. In particular, these authors found that the pos-
itive or negative behaviors they previously associated with
novel faces appeared to transfer (in broad valence terms) to
composite faces including the aforementioned novel faces. As
such, it seems unlikely that fluency is the primary mechanism
influencing how composite faces are automatically perceived.
Our view, however, is that it is unlikely to play no role what-
soever and that future research could usefully examine it in
isolation. One idea such research might pursue is to examine
the consequences of digitally combining multiple unfamiliar
faces into one composite face. We believe that this might re-
sult in a composite face that is perceived to be more familiar,
thus enabling familiarity to be studied while perfectly con-
trolling for valence effects (since all the source faces would
be unknown.)
A final limitation relates to the valence judgments we
have argued underlie the effects we have observed. We have
argued that our data support the view that when evaluating
an apparently unknown face, if that face subtly resembles
a known individual (which we achieve via morphing), then
a valence judgment of that known individual automatically
colors ratings of the apparently (and consciously perceived
to be) unknown face. Indeed, one of the major contributions
of this work is revealing that such valence accessibility is
possible. What this article does not examine, however, is
the process via which such summary valence judgments are
formed. For example, while study 2B empirically demon-
strated that exposure to the Bush-morph appeared to invoke
an approach motivation in our participants, it had nothing
to say about why this might be. Indeed, the reader might
legitimately wonder why such an apparently polarizing fig-
ure would invoke an approach motivation. While we believe
understanding the origins of summary valence evaluations
is a (highly complex) issue for future research to explore,
one thing we would stress is that the approach and avoid
distinction is a fundamental driver of motivation across all
life forms (Elliot and Covington 2001) and is perhaps best
conceptualized as a primal big picture distinction between
stimuli likely to be beneficial or harmful (Elliot 2006). As
we speculated earlier, our belief is that Bush’s automatic
association with the presidency is a likely candidate for
explaining the approach motivation we observed, but it re-
mains exactly that, speculation. We suggest that future re-
search on valence judgments should focus both on the pri-
mary roles people are associated with (particularly relevant
for celebrities whose fame relates to acting) as well as the
actual behaviors they carry out in their real lives (which
were clearly relevant in study 3). Indeed, it is worth noting
that one benefit of the digital morphing technique we used
is that it actually provides a method via which valence as-
sessments of known individuals can be implicitly measured.
Conclusion
From salesmen to print ads, the human face is almost
ever-present across the broad spectrum of marketing com-
munication efforts. Furthermore, considerable research now
suggests that humans, as befits innately social animals, have
evolved with significant mental capabilities designed solely
to facilitate rapid implicit processing of facial information.
However, despite this nontrivial confluence between mar-
keting practice and neural circuitry, little attention has been
paid to understanding the possible ramifications such au-
tomatic facial evaluations may have in marketing contexts.
While marketers narrowly focus on digitally manipulating
attractiveness, our results suggest that manipulations of fa-
miliarity may have similar potential to influence consumers.
As such, we hope that these initial findings may help to
precipitate a broader stream of research in marketing on the
automatic processing of facial imagery. We suspect that this
research will reveal that, rather than being one environ-
mental prime among many, faces are actually the recipients
of a dramatically disproportionate amount of our automatic
attentional resources. Indeed, we believe that faces may ac-
tually be the most primal of primes.
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